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Commercial Impracticability-An Overview
Robert Sommer*
As shortages become more severe and prices continue to climb,
both suppliers and purchasers are confronted with increasingly
more burdensome performance arising from long-term, set-price
contracts. As performance becomes more burdensome, greater numbers of beleaguered promisors will turn to § 2-615 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in hopes of excusing nonperformance. The purpose of this article is to discuss the doctrine of impracticability as
codified in § 2-615. This article will discuss the historical antecedents of the doctrine of impracticability, the mechanics set up by
the Code to regulate the operation of the doctrine, case law applying
the Code mechanics and, finally, a few questions left unanswered
by the Code.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

Overview

The early common law excused performance of duties imposed by
law on grounds of impossibility but refused to excuse performance
of contractual obligations on the same grounds.' The theory was
that a promise was absolute unless, and only to the extent, qualified
by the promisor. According to Williston, the rule did not long remain absolute. The initial exceptions were illness or death of the
promisor, and supervening statutory or governmental prohibition of
the act to be performed. 2 From the middle of the 19th century on,
the development of the doctrine of impossibility, as summarized by
Williston, was:
[The early cases] adopt[ed] a strict rule which
require[d] the parties, when they form[ed] a contract, to
foresee its consequences as accurately as possible, though at
the expense of serious hardship to one of them if unforeseen
*

B.A., Washington and Jefferson College, 1969; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1973.

1. See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1681).
2. 6 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAmcS
[hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].

§ 1931 (rev. ed. 1938)
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circumstances render[ed] it impossible to perform his promise
• . .[The later cases3 adopted] a rule giving an excuse under
such circumstances.
An early liberalization of the rule developed to deal with the
situations where there was a destruction of the subject matter of the
contract. It is now generally accepted that the destruction of the
subject matter of the contract, if it involves no fault on the part of
the promisor, excuses nondelivery. 4 This extension was viewed with
some suspicion, however, and as will be seen, the courts did not
excuse nonperformance on grounds of impossibility unless the impossibility was objective (inherent in the general situation) rather
than subjective (due to the capabilities of the given promisor).
Thus, a widget manufacturer was generally not excused from
supplying widgets if his plant burned down, as long as he could
obtain the promised widgets in the market. Some courts refused to
excuse nonperformance regardless of the drastic nature of supervening events or the fact that the impossibility was objective, so long
as the court read the agreement to perform to be "absolute." '
Because the doctrine of impossibility was so rigidly applied, the
doctrine proved unworkable. Consequently, courts developed the
theory of implied conditions. According to Williston, the doctrine of
implied conditions developed as a means of avoiding the harsh results that flowed from a strict application of the narrow impossibility exceptions (death, government intervention, destruction of subject matter) to the general rule that a contractual obligation was not
relieved by any supervening event.'
As is often the case when a new doctrine is developed to avoid
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id.at 5407.
Id.
See, e.g., Broderick Wood Prods. Co. v. United States, 195 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952).
Williston went on to say:
As in the case where the courts overturned the long prevailing doctrine of independency of promises in a bilateral contract, so in regard to the defense of impossibility it
was found easier to evade the earlier doctrine by giving a new construction to certain
promises than to overthrow the doctrine directly. It became a frequent mode of expression to say that where impossibility constitutes an excuse for failing to perform the
terms of a promise, it is because there is an "implied condition" in the promise,
without noting that such a condition is "constructive," that is, based on other reasons
than the expressions of the parties.
In truth the foundation is the same as in the case of mistake; the two defenses are
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problems created by an earlier one, the theory of implied conditions
not only failed to ameliorate the harshness of the absolute, objective
impossibility rule, it also created new problems. The determination
of whether the promises were subject to implied conditions became
dependent upon the overall result desired. When a court felt that
the promisor should not be excused it found the promise to be "absolute" and thus not subject to any implied conditions.7 Judicial
flexibility was achieved but legal precedent and predictability
suffered.
Williston suggested that the best approach would be to determine
what risks each party to the agreement had assumed. If it were
determined that the party seeking to be excused had not assumed
the risk of the events forming the basis for the excuse, then the
analysis should proceed to determine whether those events were of
such a nature as to excuse nonperformance. As to the second determination, Williston recommended that the court should determine
whether the unforeseen events, which the party seeking to be excused had not assumed, rendered the promisor's performance vitally
different from what the parties, at the time of the agreement, reasonably contemplated it would be.' The language of the Restatement of Contracts9 and the Uniform Commercial Code 0 would seem
to indicate they have adopted this approach. As will be seen, however, the cases both prior to and under the Code have continued to
rely on the older doctrines of absolute promise, subjective versus
objective impossibility, absolute or scientific impossibility and the
doctrine of implied conditions.
substantially identical in principle, and often the same situation will involve both. As
the basis for the defense of mistake is the presumed assumption by the parties of some
vital supposed fact, so the basis of the defense of impossibility is the presumed mutual
assumption when the contract is made that some fact essential to performance then
exists, or that it will exist when the time for performance arrives. The only evidence,
however, of such mutual assumption is, generally, that the court thinks a reasonable
person, that is, the court itself, would not have contemplated taking the risk of the
existence of the fact in question.
WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 1937 (footnotes omitted).
7. Broderick Wood Prods. Co. v. United States, 195 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952).
8. WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 1932.
9. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 454-69 (1932).
10. See text accompanying notes 43-68 infra.
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Pre-Code Case Law

Regardless of which theory or approach was applied by the courts
prior to the Code, the cases in which performance was excused cluster around five areas:
1) Impossibility due to change in law;
2) Impossibility due to death or illness;
3) Impossibility due to destruction of subject matter of the contract;
4) Impossibility due to failure of some means of performance;
and
5) Those situations in which performance remains possible but
the value of that performance to one or both parties has
changed drastically due to an unforeseen event.
1. Change of Law
It is generally agreed that a contractual duty is discharged where
performance is subsequently prohibited by a judicial, legislative,
executive or administrative order." Where a statute has rendered
illegal a performance that was legal when bargained for (the most
typical situation) there is apparent unanimous agreement that the
contractual duty of performance is discharged. 2 Similarly, nearly
unanimous authority exists for the proposition that performance is
excused when governmental intervention makes performance impossible.
In contrast to the problems of supervening government intervention stand the cases where the contracted performance was illegal
11. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 458(b) (1932); WMrLSTON, supra note 2, § 1938.
12. For example, lessees have generally been discharged from the remaining terms of
leases which provided that the premises were to be used solely as a tavern, when the local,
state or national government subsequently prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages. See
Schaub v. Wright, 79 Ind. App. 56, 130 N.E. 143 (1921); Marshall v. Smith, 17 Ohio Op. 2d
173, 174 N.E.2d 558 (C.P. Miami Co. 1960); Stratford, Inc. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co.,
94 Wash. 125, 162 P. 31 (1916).
13. In Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619 (1921), a ship owner had agreed
to charter a ship for a particular voyage between Texas and South Africa. The ship owner
was excused from liability for nonperformance because of the fact that the British Government had requisitioned the ship for war service shortly before the ship was to be delivered
for charter. Analogously, in L.N. Jackson & Co. v. Royal Norwegian Gov't, 177 F.2d 694 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950), where a ship owner had contracted to carry copra
from East Africa to New York, but subsequently was ordered by the Maritime Commission
to carry wool because of the wartime wool emergency, the ship owner's nonperformance was
also excused. See also Flaster v. Seaboard Gage Corp., 61 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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or prohibited at the time of the contracting. Here the courts' analysis generally concentrates on whether the promisor assumed the risk
of impossibility, and whether the promisor or promisee should have
known that performance was not legally permissible. In Partridge
v. Presley,4 a contract for the sale of real estate included a provision
that vendor would acquire the necessary permit to change the house
into a two-family dwelling. The vendor was excused not only from
acquiring the permit but also from delivering the house because the
applicable zoning ordinance restricted the area to one-family dwellings. The court ruled that the contract could not legally be performed through no fault of the vendor and the vendor's failure to
perform could not render him liable. 5
Such a result is open to criticism. It seems likely that the vendor
obligated himself to obtain the necessary permit in spite of any
zoning ordinance restrictions to the contrary. Surely one who buys
and sells real estate is presumably aware of the fact that zoning
ordinances control the uses to which a property may be put. Furthermore, one who promises to obtain a permit to change the use to
which a dwelling is put must also presumably be aware that a permit may not be issued if the change is not in accord with the uses
permitted by the zoning ordinance. Unfortunately, the court did not
explain how it decided that vendor had not assumed the risk that
the permit might not be granted.
Partridgeand other cases like itl" are of questionable persuasiveness, however, in light of Security Sewage Equipment Co. v.
7 which indicates that before discharging a promisor from
McFerren,1
his obligation to perform, the court must scrutinize the agreement
to establish whether or not the promisor assumed the risk of existing
governmental prohibitions or regulations. This case will be more
fully developed later.
2.

Death or Illness

It is generally agreed that death or disabling illness of a promisor
discharges his obligation to perform if the performance could only
have been rendered by him. The issue in such cases usually is
14. 189 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 850 (1951).
15. Id. at 648.
16. See also Duff v. Trenton Beverage Co., 4 N.J. 595, 73 A.2d 578 (1950); Di Biasio v.
Ross, 43 R.I. 78, 110 A. 415 (1920).
17. 14 Ohio St. 2d 251, 237 N.E.2d 898 (1968).
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whether the performance was such that it could only have been
rendered by the deceased or disabled promisor.'8
3.

Destruction of the Subject Matter of the Contract

Taylor v. Caldwell" is perhaps the case most widely cited for the
proposition that destruction of the subject matter of the contract
discharges the obligation to perform. There an owner of a music hall
was excused from furnishing the hall for plaintiff's use on the dates
agreed because prior to the date of performance the hall was completely destroyed by fire. The decision was based on the theory of
implied conditions-that the duties under contract were subject to
an implied condition that the hall continue in existence. The court's
analysis is noteworthy. It excused performance by finding that the
promise had not been absolute; that instead it was subject to an
implied condition of "continued existence" and that such condition
having failed, the promisor was excused. As suggested above, this
mode of analysis has proven unwieldy. The modem approach, now
almost universally followed, is that destruction of specifically identified goods excuses promisor from performing except to the extent
promisor has assumed the risk of such destruction by the terms of
the agreement.2
4.

Failureor Destruction of the Means of Performance

Later authorities expanded the holding in Taylor to excuse nonperformance where the promisor and promisee understood performance would be rendered via a given source and performance later
became "impossible" because that source was destroyed. 2 ' It is in
reference to this class of cases that Williston and the Restatement
argue that the term "impossible" be abandoned because performance usually remains possible, though it has become considerably
more burdensome because of the depletion of the mutually assumed
means of performance. The Restatement suggests that nonperformance be excused where (1) the agreement provided or the parties
contemplated at the time of the agreement that a specific thing was
18. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 459 (1932); WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 1940; Annot.,
84 A.L.R.2d 12, § 8 (1962).
19. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
20. WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 1946; 67 AM. JuR. 2d Sales § 359 (1973); Annot., 84
A.L.R.2d 12, § 19 (1962).
21. See text accompanying notes 25 & 26 infra.
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necessary for promisor's performance, (2) that thing was subsequently destroyed or damaged to such an extent so as to render
performance materially more burdensome for promisor, and (3)
such destruction or damage did not involve fault on the part of
promisor seeking to be excused." Williston suggests the same ap23
proach.
There have been numerous cases discharging liability for the failure to deliver crops where both parties understood that the crops
were to be produced on certain land, where neither party assumed
liability for a natural calamity and where a natural calamity (such
as a flood) subsequently made it impossible to raise the crops.' 4
This analysis has application to other problems relating to raw
material shortages. In Housing Authority v. East Tennessee Light
& Power Co.,5 the promisor had agreed to supply natural gas to the
promisee for a five-year period. The continued availability and sufficiency of gas from a particular field was found to be an implied
condition of the contract. The promisor was, therefore, excused from
performing when gas output at that field became seriously diminished. 6
Many cases indicate that the older notions of risk foreseeability
and subjective impossibility still creep into the decisions despite the
position of Williston and the Restatement. In El Rio Oils Ltd. v.
Pacific Coast Asphalt Co. ,27 the promisor was required to perform,
22.

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§§ 460-61 (1932).

23. Not only where a specific thing is itself to be sold or transferred, but wherever
a contract required for its performance the existence of a specific thing, the fortuitous
destruction of that thing, or such impairment of it as makes it unavailable, excuses
the promisor, unless he has clearly assumed the risk of its continued existence.
WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 1948, at 5457 (citations omitted).
24. International Paper Co. v. Rockefeller, 161 App. Div. 180, 146 N.Y.S. 371 (1914), is a
typical example. There the promisor had contracted to deliver specific amounts of wood to
the promisee's mill over a five-year period. The court ruled that in light of the fact that both
parties understood that the wood was to be cut from a certain tract of land (the contract was
conditioned on seller's obtaining the land) the promisor was excused when a fire destroyed
all the wood on the land. See also Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 12, § 20 (1962).
25. 183 Va. 64, 31 S.E.2d 273 (1944).
26. Although the contract did not specify a particular nearby gas field as the source of
the gas, there was only one in the vicinity, and the court ruled that it was adequately
demonstrated that the gas to be delivered under the contract was to be produced by that
nearby field. Further it is noteworthy that the contract was qualified by a "force majeure"
clause and that prior to the execution of the contract, engineers had advised the promisor
that production of gas from the field would be ample to meet the requirements of the contract.
Id. at 75, 31 S.E.2d at 277-78.
27. 95 Cal. App. 2d 186, 213 P.2d 1 (1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1950).
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though the case for excusing performance was more compelling than
that in East Tennessee Light & Power Co. In El Rio Oils the promisor manufactured asphalt from oil which he obtained from a certain
oil producer. The oil company refused to perform its prior agreement with the asphalt company to deliver oil. Consequently, the
asphalt company (promisor) was unable to produce asphalt as per
the agreement. The court ruled that the promisor was not excused
from performing, in spite of the actions of the third-party oil company which cut off the very source of supply which both parties
realized was essential to produce the asphalt. The decision was
based on the subjective impossibility rule, that performance was not
inherently impossible, but impossible only because of promisor's
peculiar situation. It is entirely possible the court felt that the asphalt company should be held liable to its purchaser, because it
could pursue whatever remedies it had against the oil company,
which presumably was solvent. If that was the rationale, the court
should have based the result on a finding that, as between the
parties to the agreement, the asphalt company had assumed the risk
of the oil company's nonperformance. The use of the subjective rule
as the rationale for refusing to excuse the promisor's breach provides
little insight into the court's thinking.
Similarly, in Kentucky Lumber & Millwork Co. v. George H.
Rommell Co.,2 the court held that the promisor was not excused
from delivering millwork, though subsequent to the making of the
agreement his mill was completely destroyed by fire. While the
court suggested that the promisor's mill had been destroyed as a
result of his negligence, the court based its refusal to excuse promisor's non-performance on the theory that promisor's inability to
perform was subjective, and performance remained objectively possible. Thus, when evaluating a situation involving failure or
destruction of a specific means of performance, a court can short
circuit an "impossibility" argument by applying the theory of
subjective impossibility.
5. Performance Remains Possible but the Cost of That Performance to Promisoror the Value of That Performanceto PromiseeHas
Changed DrasticallyDue to an Unforeseen Event
These situations, at times categorized under the theory of frustra28.

257 Ky. 371, 78 S.W.2d 52 (1934).
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tion of contract, and at other times under the more general theory
of implied conditions, have created the greatest confusion in this
area of contract law. While subject to some noted exceptions, 29 nonperformance is rarely excused on grounds that performance has become extremely burdensome2 ° Promisors have enjoyed considerably
more success in avoiding liability for nonperformance in cases where
performance is still possible but the agreement no longer has any
value to the promisor because of a supervening event. La Cumbre
Golf & Country Club v. Santa Barbara Hotel Co., 31 is a typical
example. There a country club agreed to extend golfing privileges
to the guests of a nearby hotel for a certain term for a monthly fee
of $300. Shortly after the term began, the hotel was completely
destroyed by fire through no fault of the owners. The hotel was
excused from paying the monthly fee for the balance of the term on
the basis that the agreement was subject to an implied condition
that the hotel continue to have guests. Similarly, in Parrishv. Stratton Cripple Creek Mining & Development Co.,32 the promisor was
excused because the agreement had become valueless to him. There,
29. An interesting example of this type of situation is Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard,
172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916). There, the promisor had agreed to take from the land of the
promisee all the gravel promisor needed to fulfill a supply contract for the construction of a
bridge. After the promisor had removed a considerable amount of gravel the water table was
reached. Though there was still sufficient gravel to fulfill the promisor's needs for the bridge
construction, the cost of dredging and drying the underwater gravel was estimated at ten
times the expense of procuring above-ground gravel from another source. The promisor was
excused from liability for not procuring all his gravel from the promisee's land (the promisor
had obtained the balance of gravel needed-another 50,000 cubic yards-from other, abovewater sources). The court reasoned that when the parties stipulated that all of the earth and
gravel required for the bridge project would be taken from the promisee's land, they assumed
that sufficient quantities for that purpose were obtainable above the water line. The court
indicated that the promisor could not have excused himself merely because the project had
proved more expensive than anticipated, or merely because it had proved unprofitable. But
where, as here, the difference in cost was so great as to have the effect of making performance
impracticable, the promisor could be excused.
30. The general rule has been explained thusly:
It must be said, however, that the view to the effect that extreme impracticability
of performance may be regarded, in law, as amounting to impossibility which excuses
the promisor from liability for nonperformance, seems not to have been adopted very
extensively, so far as the representative cases covered in this comment note indicate.
Its application would seem to require a difficult distinction between mere difficulty,
expense, or hardship (rather generally regarded as no excuse for nonperformance. .. )
and (in the Restatement's words) "impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved."
Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 12, 62 (1962). See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
31. 205 Cal. 422, 271 P. 476 (1928).
32. 116 F.2d 207 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 698 (1940).
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a mining company had given a trucking company a contract to haul
all of the coal from the promisor's mine which was destined for a
certain milling company. Shortly thereafter the milling company
became bankrupt. The mining company terminated its agreement
with the trucking company, but was discharged from any resultant
liability. Arguably, the mining company did not breach its agreement since it was found only to allow the hauling company to transport the coal destined for the milling company, and the court need
not have reached the frustration question. The court ruled, however,
that the mining company was excused because both parties had
assumed that the milling company would continue to operate and
the contract had become subject to that implied condition.
C.

General Problems

The discussion has thus far been directed towards examining the
various theories that have developed which excuse nonperformance
on the basis that performance has become unduly burdensome,
impractical, or impossible. The cases have been selected to exemplify the development of the various theories. As indicated, there is
by no means general acceptance of any of the various theories, and
this is especially true of the theories of implied conditions and of
frustration. Even the more widely accepted bases for excuse (death
or illness, supervening legal prohibition or destruction of the subject
matter of the contract) are subject in some jurisdictions to severe
restrictions which at times appear to swallow the exception. Therefore, it is appropriate to outline the kinds of problems encountered
whichever theory is argued.
1. Assumption of Risk
If a court feels that the promisor, either by the terms or nature of
the agreement, assumed the risk of the occurrence which subsequently rendered performance impossible, the promisor will not be
discharged from liability for nonperformance. Wills v. Shockley33
illustrates the point. A contractor, experienced in salvage operations, agreed to raise a sunken boat and bring the boat to dock. After
the agreement, the boat slipped from the rocks upon which it had
come to rest, sank into deeper water and filled with mud. This made
33.

52 Del. 295, 157 A.2d 252 (1960).
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it impossible to raise the boat. The court analyzed the assumption
of risk issue in terms of promisor's undertaking and held that the
promisor was not discharged. In Broderick Wood Products Co. v.
United States,34 a similar result was reached by finding the promise
to be absolute by the terms of the contract. The promisor was held
liable for damages according to the liquidated damages provision of
the agreement, even though the delay had been occasioned by extreme weather conditions. The Wills approach is, of course, preferable but the Broderick Wood approach is not atypical. In either case,
careful drafting would have avoided the problem.
Foreseeabilityof Event Rendering PerformanceImpossible

2.

The supervening event which renders the performance impossible
or unduly burdensome will not excuse the promisor unless the court
decides that the "promisor had no reason to anticipate [the occurrence] and for the occurrence of which [event] he is not in contributing fault."3 Thus, in Sale v. State Highway & Public Works
Commission,3" promisor's buildings, an essential subject matter of
the contract, were completely destroyed by fire due to promisor's
negligence. The promisor's nonperformance was not excused. Similarly, where the promisor voluntarily discontinued its business operations, the promisor's contractual obligations were not excused,
even though the contract was viewed as containing an implied condition that the promisor would continue in business."
Powers v. Siats38 is an example of the type of situation in which
nonperformance is occasioned by an unanticipated event but the
promisor is not excused because of his contributing fault. There, the
promisor (carrier) contracted to deliver a certain quantity of eggs at
a temperature of 50 degrees. The consignor delivered the eggs to the
carrier at a temperature ten degrees warmer than agreed to. Although aware of this fact the defendant carrier made no successful
efforts to reduce the temperature of the eggs while in transit. The
eggs reached their destination at a temperature of 62 degrees; the
purchaser refused to accept them and sued for damages. The court
ruled that the defense of impossibility had no merit because the
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

195 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952).
§ 457 (1932).
242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955).
Martin v. Star Publishing Co., 50 Del. 181, 126 A.2d 238 (1956).
244 Minn. 515, 70 N.W.2d 344 (1955).
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defendant was in contributing fault, as it could have taken other
steps to avoid delivering the eggs at an unacceptable temperature.
Unduly Burdensome Performance

3.

Perhaps the most important caveat is that the position taken by
Williston and the Restatement (that performance need not be scientifically impossible in order for nonperformance to be excused) has
not been widely adopted. The generally applied rule still appears to
be that:
[Ulnexpected difficulty, expense, or hardship will not excuse
a contractual promisor from performing his undertaking, where
the contract does not provide otherwise and the difficulty does
not make performance objectively impossible.39
In Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co.,4" the promisor was
not excused in spite of the fact that performance became very burdensome. There, promisor, a producer of soybean oil, had promised
to deliver 36 tank cars of oil over a 12-month period, at a rate of
three tank cars per month. The agreed price was 11.75 cents per
pound or the O.P.A. ceiling price in effect at time of shipment.
Promisor had yet to deliver six tank cars of oil when O.P.A. removed
the ceiling price on soybeans entirely, causing the price of soybean
oil to rise to 25 cents per pound. The promisor did not receive any
benefit from the contract escalator clause because the price ceiling
had been eliminated instead of raised. The court ruled that the
promisor was not excused merely because performance had become
more expensive than anticipated, and despite the fact that it became more expensive because of unanticipated government regulation.
This "absolute" approach seems to be the general rule in agreements concerning the delivery of unidentified goods. Thus it has
been said:
Under an executory contract of sale relating to unidentified
property which might be fulfilled by the delivery of any property of the kind and quantity stipulated for, the seller as a
general rule assumed absolute liability to make delivery, and
was not excused from nonperformance by the happening of
39.
40.

Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 12, 110 (1962).
153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951).
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unforeseen events or accidental causes preventing his filling the
contract in the manner he might have contemplated.'
D.

Summary Of HistoricalBackground

The early common law doctrine held impossibility to be no excuse
for nonperformance of a contractual obligation. That position did
not long remain absolute. Gradually, it became accepted that death
or debilitating illness of the promisor was an excuse when performance depended on promisor's unique abilities. Destruction, without
fault, of the specified thing to be made available also came to be
recognized as an excuse, as did supervening prohibition by the government of the act to be performed. Even these limited exceptions,
however, were restricted by the doctrine of objective impossibility,
and by the doctrine of assumption of risk.
In order to avoid the harshness of a narrow application of the
doctrine of impossibility, the courts developed the theory of implied
conditions. As an unfortunate corollary to this theory, the courts
developed the theory of the absolute promise. Under that theory,
before examining an agreement to see if it was subject to any implied conditions, the courts would first decide whether promisor had
made an absolute promise to perform. This analysis became very
confusing. Williston and the Restatement suggest that the analysis
should involve two steps. First, what risks had each party assumed?
This, Williston suggests, would clarify the real issue at the heart of
the absolute promise cases. Second, did any unforeseen risk, not
assumed by the promisor, make his performance vitally different
from that which both parties reasonably contemplated? The attempt here was to avoid the harshness of the rule that (even under
the implied conditions theory) the supervening event had to make
performance objectively and scientifically impossible.
The more liberal approach suggested by Williston does not appear
to have been widely accepted. Perhaps the widest acceptance is
found in those cases dealing with the failure of a specified source of
supply. In order for such an occurrence to excuse nonperformance,
the following requirements must be met: (1) the particular source
must have been specified in the agreement or at the very least
41. 67 Am. JuR. 2d Sales § 362 (1973). See also Broderick Wood Prods. Co. v. United
States, 195 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952); Gross v. Exeter Mach. Works, 277 Pa. 363, 121 A. 195
(1923).
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contemplated by both parties; (2) no other source must have been
contemplated by the parties; (3) the source's depletion must not
have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (4) the depletion must
not have occurred as a result of any fault of the promisor. Furthermore, promisors have had little success in avoiding liability when
the source failed because of a breach by a third party or due to
prolonged strikes,42 for these are generally considered risks the
promisor should have foreseen.
Finally, courts have seemed reluctant to abandon the notion of
scientific impossibility. Few courts have accepted Williston's concept of "vitally different performance." This reluctance is especially
marked when dealing with situations concerning the delivery of nonidentified goods. Courts have generally limited the doctrine of excusable breach to conditions which render performance objectively
and scientifically impossible.
II.

IMPRACTICABILITY UNDER THE CODE

With this background in mind, the Uniform Commercial Code is
now considered. Section 2-613 codifies the generally accepted rules
as to casualty to identified goods. It provides that casualty to identified goods avoids the contract if the loss is total. It gives the buyer
the option, if the loss is partial, of avoiding the contract entirely or
accepting the partially damaged goods or that part of the goods not
damaged, with due allowance in the contract price.4 3 In order to be
excused the promisor must show (1) the goods contracted for were
identified when the contract was made; (2) the goods were damaged
without fault of the promisor; (3) the promisor had not assumed the
risk of loss to the goods; (4) the contract requires for its performance
the identified goods; and (5) the risk of loss had not yet passed to
the buyer."
More noteworthy is the Code's treatment of impracticability
problems. Section 2-615 of the Code provides that nonperformance
will be excused if nonperformance is occasioned by the occurrence
of a contingency (1) the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made; (2) the risk of which had not
42. See El Rio Oils Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Asphalt Co., 95 Cal. App. 2d 186, 213 P.2d 1
(1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1950); text accompanying note 27 supra.

43.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

44.

Id.

§ 2-613.
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been assumed by the promisor; and (3) which renders performance
impracticable." Section 2-615 also excuses nonperformance occasioned by good faith compliance with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order, whether or not it later
proves to be invalid.46
The language of § 2-615 and the official commentary thereto indicate a strong preference on the part of the drafters for the Williston
and Restatement approach to this area. Impossibility is rejected in
favor of "impracticability." The language of the introduction to §
2-615 also seems to indicate that promisees have the burden of
proving that promisors assumed the risk of the contingency which
has rendered performance "impracticable." 7
The comments make it clear that the term "impracticability" was
chosen to emphasize the drafters' intention that courts look to the
commercial setting in which a problem arises rather than apply
absolute or scientific (objective) impossibility notions.4 8 Given that
the commercial setting is to be emphasized, and given also that
something less than scientific impossibility will excuse the promisor's performance, the crucial question becomes the meaning of
"impracticability." Comment 4 suggests that in determining
whether an unforeseen contingency has rendered performance impracticable two factors must be weighed: (1) the nature of the
contingency; and (2) the effect the contingency has had on the
45.

Section 2-615 provides:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the
preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies
with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if
performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller's
capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries among his customers
but may at his option include regular customers not then under contract as well as
his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner
which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or nondelivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated quota
thus made available for the buyer.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615.
46. Id.
47. See id., Comment 8.
48. Id., Comment 3.
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promisor's ability to perform." The comment points out that a dras-

tic change in the market is not of itself sufficient to excuse
nonperformance-the drastic change must be caused by some unforeseen contingency (e.g., war, embargo, failure of source of supply,
etc.). It appears that the more likely it is that the promisor was
aware of the possibility of the supervening event, the more critical
the event's effect on promisor's ability to perform must be in order
to excuse nonperformance. Conversely, the more unexpected the
supervening event, the less drastic its effect on the promisor's ability to perform must be in order to excuse nonperformance.
Source of supply cases are afforded special treatment under the
Code. Where it can be shown that: (1) the parties assumed a particular source of supply for the promisor's performance; (2) the promisor has taken proper steps to assure himself access to necessary
supplies; and (3) the assumed source fails without fault on the part
of the promisor, then the promisor will be excused." This comment
also suggests a solution to the El Rio Oils type problem 5 -that the
promisor be excused but that he transfer his rights against his defaulting supplier to the promisee.
In the depleted source of supply situation the emphasis of the
analysis is on whether the parties contemplated a particular source
of supply for performance. If they did, and the source fails, the
element of "impracticability" seems to be assumed. It would seem
to follow that one seeking to excuse nonperformance would be well
advised to characterize supervening events as having interfered with
or destroyed a contemplated source of supply (rather than having
drastically altered the general market) so as to render the promisor's
performance commercially impractical. In the latter situation the
promisor must explain the impact of the unforeseen events on his
ability to perform in very persuasive terms since courts rarely excuse
49. Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due
to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance.
Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly
the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended
to cover. But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency
such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of
supply or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents
the seller from securing supplies necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of this section.
Id., Comment 4.
50. Id., Comment 5.
51. See text at note 27 supra.
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nonperformance merely because performance has become more
costly.
One final note on the official commentary is appropriate. Comment 6 to § 2-615 states:
6. In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served
by either answer when the issue is posed in flat terms of "excuse" or "no excuse," adjustment under the various provisions
of this Article is necessary, especially the sections on good
faith, on insecurity and assurance and on the reading of all
provisions in the light of their purposes, and the general policy
of this Act to use equitable principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith.5 2
This comment seems to suggest that at times the best solution
would be a modification of the contract price rather than a ruling
of "excuse" or "no excuse." As will be discussed, however, this
suggestion has not yet been followed.
In spite of the language of § 2-615 and the official commentary
thereto the reported cases which have applied the Code provisions
indicate that "impracticability" still translates into something akin
to "impossibility." In Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United
States,53 the court, while not basing its decision on § 2-615 (the
transaction occurred prior to the adoption of the Code), did look to
that section as an indication of the current state of the law. The
promisor had agreed with the government to transport wheat from
Texas to Iran, for an agreed consideration of approximately
$200,000. Prior to the completion of the voyage, the Mideast crisis
of 1956 broke out, and the Egyptian government nationalized and
blocked the Suez Canal. As a result, the voyage was routed around
the tip of Africa, adding an estimated cost of $43,000. The shipper
sued the government for the added cost on the theory that when the
Egyptians blocked the canal the contract became impossible to perform. Shipper's decision to go around Africa was, it was argued, a
rendition of services divorced from the original contract for which
shipper should recover on a theory of quantum meruit. After commenting on § 2-615 of the Code, the court said:
While it may be an overstatement to say that increased cost
52.
53.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-615, Comment 6.

363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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and difficulty of performance never constitute impracticability, to justify relief there must be more of a variation between expected cost and the cost of performing by an available
alternative than is present in this case, where the promisor can
legitimately be presumed to have accepted some degree of abnormal risk, and where impracticability is urged on the basis
of added expense alone.54
The court, therefore, ruled that the contract never became "impossible" and denied plaintiff any recovery for the added costs.
While it may be granted that the voyage was at all times possible,
it seems clear that a voyage from Texas to Iran via the Suez Canal
is a far different undertaking than a voyage from Texas to Iran
around the tip of Africa. They would appear to be essentially different undertakings. Yet the court ruled that "price alone" was not
enough, even though the added costs exceeded 25% of the originally
projected costs.
The test of "impracticability" thus remains a difficult one to
meet. Furthermore, the case indicates that promisors may have a
difficult time establishing that they did not assume the risk of the
supervening event, for the court did not make it clear why it felt that
the promisor had assumed "some degree of abnormal risk."55
United States v. Wegematic Corp.5 is perhaps a better illustration of the assumption of risk problem. There, Wegematic had
promised to produce and deliver a computer with certain capabilities to the Federal Reserve Board. Subsequent to the agreement but
prior to the date of delivery, Wegematic claimed that the technological problems had become insurmountable, and did not deliver.
When sued by the government, Wegematic defended on the grounds
that performance had become impracticable. The court concluded
that the federal law should follow the Code since the Code had been
widely adopted. But it rejected, on two bases, Wegematic's defense
that technological difficulties made performance "impracticable"
within the meaning of § 2-615. The Federal Reserve Board, in seeking bids from manufacturers to furnish a particular computer, con54. Id. at 319 (citations omitted).
55. Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the Transatlanticdecision is that the court
made no reference to the suggestion in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 6 that
there be an equitable adjustment in price, though the fact situation seems tailor-made for it.
Rather, the court resolved the problem in terms of "excuse" or "no excuse" and may, therefore, be assumed to have rejected Comment 6 as too vague and indefinite of application.
56. 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
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templated that it would be furnished the computer-it did not contemplate that Wegematic perform only if Wegematic might technologically succeed in producing the computer it promised. Furthermore, though the prospect of Wegematic having to expend
$1,000,000 to $1,500,000 on redesign might make performance unattractive, additional expenditure of such sums did not make performance prohibitive in light of the patented gross of the entire
computer program."
The opinion is of particular interest because of its analysis of the
question of assumption of risk and its analysis of the meaning of
"impracticability."
The case strongly suggests, as did
Transatlantic,that although the Code seems to liberalize the rules
concerning impossibility, it will remain difficult for nonperforming
promisors to establish commercial "impracticability." The opinion
is also useful in terms of its analysis of the non-assumption of risk
element of the promisor's case. The opinion looks to both the nature
of the promisor's representations and the nature of the promised
undertaking in arriving at the conclusion that the promisor bore the
risk of the technology proving inadequate.
As discussed above, the comments to § 2-615 suggest that cases
involving failure of sources of supply are particularly appropriate for
excusing nonperformance. The cases have followed that suggestion.
In SCA International,Inc. v. Garfield & Rosen, Inc.,58 the promisor
was excused from liability for not delivering a certain quantity and
quality of shoes because
manufacturing operations were disrupted by unprecedented
floods which occurred in the region of Florence in the early part
of November 1966. The factories in which the shoes were being
manufactured were damaged, as were some of the necessary
57.

The court stated:
Beyond this the evidence of true impracticability was far from compelling. The large
sums predicted by defendant's witnesses must be appraised in relation not to the single
computer ordered by the Federal Reserve Board, evidently for a bargain price, but to
the entire ALWAC 800 program as originally contemplated. Although the record gives
no idea what this was, even twenty-five machines would gross $10,000,000 if priced at
the level of the comparable IBM equipment. While the unanticipated need for expending $1,000,000 or $1,500,000 on redesign might have made such a venture unattractive,
as defendant's management evidently decided, the sums are thus not so clearly prohibitive as it would have them appear.
Id. at 677.
58. 337 F. Supp. 246 (D. Mass. 1971).
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supplies of leather, linings, soles and inner soles. These conditions made impossible the completion and delivery of the shoes
within the time stipulated in the orders."
It was not clear whether the contract itself specified these particular
factories as the source of supply, but the court did find that both
parties understood that the shoes to be delivered would be produced
at these factories.
Similarly in Low's EZY-Fry Potato Co. v. J.A. Wood Co.,60 promisor was excused from performance for not delivering a certain
quantity of potatoes because extreme weather conditions made it
impossible to raise potatoes to the standards specified in the contract. The decision is an indication of how § 2-615 can be read as
having codified the theory of implied conditions. The decision
states:
that if the parties contemplate a sale of all or a certain part of
the crop of a particular tract of land, and by reason of drought
or other fortuitous event, without fault of the seller, the crop
of that land fails or is destroyed, non-performance is to that
extent excused; the contract, in the absence of an express provision controlling the matter, being considered as subject to an
implied condition in this regard. 1
This administrative decision is significant in that it suggests that
the "absolute promise" approach has been dropped as Williston
suggested it should be quite some time ago. The Code language in
issue is the introductory clause to § 2-615 stating: "Except so far as
seller may have assumed a greater obligation. . . ."That
language
is not very instructive on the question of how to determine whether
or not a larger obligation has been assumed. The approach of the
EZY-Fry Potato decision is that in the absence of an express condition in the contract the seller is presumed not to have assumed the
greater risk. It should be noted, however, that the decision deals
with damage to crops or crop-producing land, and it had become
generally accepted prior to the Code that in such a situation the risk
of crop damage was borne by the purchaser.
Whether the presumption will be extended to other situations
remains to be seen. SCA International did not face the issue
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 249-50.
26 Agri. Dec. 583, 4 UCC REP. SEav. 483 (1967).
Id. at 585, 4 UCC REP. SEv. at 485.
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squarely but that decision does seem to indicate that destruction of
the source is a risk assumed by the purchaser. The Code language,
however, does not preclude a court from applying the absolute
promise rule and holding that where the promisor's obligation was
not expressly qualified, he has assumed the risk under § 2-615 and
will not be discharged, regardless of whether performance has become impracticable or impossible.
2
Deardorff-Jackson Co. v. National Produce Distributors,Inc.1
indicates that the failure of the source of supply will not excuse the
promisor if the promisor was in any way at fault for that failure.
There the promisor had agreed to deliver 50 carloads of a certain
grade of potatoes, but was unable to deliver a substantial number
of the carloads. The Agriculture Department rejected the seller's
defense of impracticability because it found that the seller knew, at
the time of contract, that his source of supply would be inadequate
to meet his obligations under the contract.
The issue of impracticability due to government regulation was
considered in Security Sewage Equipment Co. v. McFerren 3 There,
Security had agreed to deliver and install, at a particular location,
a sewage disposal plant for McFerren, a real estate developer. The
State Department of Health refused to approve the plans submitted
by McFerren's engineer for the site of the treatment facility. Instead, the Department required an alternative plan which would
have necessitated the purchase of 2,500 extra feet of pipe and the
rights of way over land between the development tract and the Ohio
River. Consequently, the facility was not built. Security sued
McFerren for failure to purchase, and McFerren counterclaimed for
Security's failure to install. The court noted that Security possessed
greater knowledge of Health Department requirements than McFerren, and held Security liable, pointing out that under Comment 10
to § 2-615, governmental interference will not excuse performance
where it does not interfere to an extent beyond the seller's assumption of the risk."
The court's analysis of why it felt Security had assumed the risk
is noteworthy. Because security had agreed "'to install . . . com62.
63.
64.

26 Agri. Dec. 1309, 4 UCC REP. SERV. 1164 (1967).
14 Ohio St. 2d 251, 237 N.E.2d 898 (1968).
The court concluded:
Ordinarily, when one contracts to render a performance for which a government
license or permit is required, it is his duty to get the license or permit so that he can
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plete and make it ready for use, and operation by the buyer, at the
delivery address specified' "5 and because it knew it could not provide and install the plant until the plans therefor had been approved
by the State, it assumed the risk of rejection of those plans.
The decision leaves some questions unclear. For example, it cannot be ascertained from the decision whether the plans for the treatment facility were not approved because of regulations existing prior
to the execution of the agreement or because of regulations adopted
subsequent thereto. Nor is there any indication of whether the unexpected burden of additional pipeline and right of way purchases
satisfied the "impracticability" test of § 2-615. Indeed, that is the
disquieting facet of the case. The court never reached the impracticability question because it decided that the seller had assumed the
risk of government rejection. There is an indication that the court
did consider the seller more familiar with the particular governmental regulations than the buyer. But it appears to have based its
determination that the seller assumed the risk of state rejection
solely on the fact that the seller had agreed to install the sewage unit
without any reservation as to government regulation. It seems safe
to say that sellers will have a more difficult time excusing nonperformance because of existing governmental regulations of which neither party was aware than excusing nonperformance occasioned by
supervening regulations.
Section 2-615 is also designed to apply to situations involving the
doctrine of commercial frustration. Comment 9 suggests that a
buyer is excused where the reasonable commercial understanding of
the agreement is that the buyer agreed to purchase for a particular
purpose and that purpose has been frustrated." But, buyers will
perform. The risk of inability to obtain it is on him; and its refusal by the government
is no defense in a suit for breach of his contract.
Id. at 254, 237 N.E.2d at 901.
65. Id. at 253, 237 N.E.2d at 900.
66. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 9 provides in part:
Exemption of the buyer in the case of a "requirements" contract is covered by the
"Output and Requirements" section both as to assumption and allocation of the relevant risks. But when a contract by a manufacturer to buy fuel or raw material makes
no specific reference to a particular venture and no such reference may be drawn from
the circumstances, commercial understanding views it as a general deal in the general
market and not conditioned on any assumption of the continuing operation of the
buyer's plant. Even when notice is given by the buyer that the supplies are needed to
fill a specific contract of a normal commercial kind, commercial understanding does
not see such a supply contract as conditioned on the continuance of the buyer's further
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nevertheless have difficulty in establishing commercial frustration
as a defense.
The issue is clearly posed in Prescon Corp. v. Savoy Construction
Co. 7 The promisor had agreed to purchase steel girders meeting
certain unique standards from a supplier. Both parties knew the
purchaser intended to use the girders to meet his obligations as a
subcontractor on a construction project. After the execution of the
agreement between the purchaser and supplier, the purchaser was
informed by the general contractor that the girders would not be
used since the engineers had changed the plans. The purchaser was
not excused from performance. In addressing itself to the requirements issue the court said:
There remains one further item requiring comment. The
appellee made a contrived effort to characterize the contract
between the parties as a "requirements" type contract. It further contends that such a contract under § 2-615 of the Uniform
Commercial Code

. .

. may, in good faith, be discontinued by

the purchaser when the "requirements" are no longer needed.
The trial judge rejected this construction of the contract and
we agree with that conclusion. A reading of the clear language
of the contract makes it obvious that this is not a "requirements" contract. Hence there is no need to review the contract
in relation to the referred section of the Uniform Commercial
Code."
Thus, a buyer seeking to avoid performance on the basis of commercial frustration must deal with the courts' lack of willingness to
characterize the transaction as being designed for a particular purpose.
III.

PROBLEMS NOT CONSIDERED

The Code does not address itself to the problem of temporary
impossibility. Suppose, for example, promisor has agreed to supply
contract for outlet. On the other hand, where the buyer's contract is in reasonable
commercial understanding conditioned on a definite and specific venture or assumption as, for instance, a war procurement subcontract known to be based on a prime
contract which is subject to termination, or a supply contract for a particular construction venture, the reason of the present section may well apply and entitle the buyer to
the exemption.
67. 259 Md. 52, 267 A.2d 222 (1970).
68. Id. at 62, 267 A.2d at 228.
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certain materials or products at a set price over a long term. Suppose further that due to market shortages the government regulates
use of the materials or distribution of the products during a part of
the term of the contract. The problem raised is whether the temporary impossibility discharges or merely suspends the obligation to
perform during the period of impossibility. In other words, will the
promisor be required to make up for the excused deliveries once the
regulations have been lifted? While the Code and comments are
silent in this regard, there is a well developed body of pre-Code law
on the subject.
The Restatement of Contracts addresses itself to the issue of temporary impossibility, approaching the issue from the standpoint of
two situations. The first is called temporary impossibility, and involves situations in which performance was to occur at a given time
or over a given time period. If performance was impossible when it
was to be rendered, but would be possible at a later time, § 462 of
the Restatement" applies. That section provides that the promisor
is not obligated to perform once performance becomes possible, if
performance at the later date would impose "a substantially greater
burden" on the promisor than performance at the originally contemplated time."
69.
70.

§ 462 (1932).
The Restatement provides:
Temporary impossibility of such character that if permanent it would discharge a
promisor's entire contractual duty, has that operation if rendering performance after
the impossibility ceases would impose a burden on the promisor substantially greater
than would have been imposed upon him had there been no impossibility; but otherwise such temporary impossibility suspends the duty of the promisor to render the
performance promised only while the impossibility exists.
Id. The comments explain:
a. The rule stated in the Section is concerned only with the duty of a promisor
whose performance has become temporarily impossible. Whether a return promisor is
discharged from his duty on account of the temporary impossibility depends on
whether the temporary delay involves essential injury to him or loss of the object for
which he bargained (see § § 274-76). Cases may arise, however, where the return promisor will suffer little or no loss by the delay, but the party whose promise has become
temporarily impossible will be penalized if he is held bound to perform when the
impossibility ceases. Since the impossibility is, under the rule stated in the Section,
of such character as to discharge the promisor if it were permanent, he is not required
to undergo serious disadvantage if it is temporary; so that, if the delayed performance
would impose a substantially greater burden upon him than he would have incurred
if there had been no impossibility, he is entirely free from duty.
b. Temporary impossibility is not the same as partial impossibility. Though the
rules governing the two situations are quite similar (see § 463), it is desirable to
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
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The other type of situation considered by the Restatement is
where performance is to be rendered over an extended period. If in
that situation performance is rendered impossible early in the term
of the agreement, and performance becomes possible once again
within the term specified in the agreement, § 463 of the Restatement of Contracts" applies. That section provides that the promisor
must perform for the balance of the term unless the partial impossibility has rendered performance of the balance of the agreement
materially more burdensome.72
The principle difference between § 462 and § 463 is best illusdistinguish performance defective only because of delay in rendering it, from performance defective in other respects.
Id., comments a & b. Illustrations 3 & 4 are useful.
3. A contracts to employ B for a month beginning January 1 and B contracts to
serve A during that month. B is seriously ill during the first part of January, but
recovers by January 20. He is under no duty to serve A after January 31.
4. A charters his vessel to B on July 5, for a voyage from New York to Liverpool,
contracting that the vessel shall be ready for loading July 10. On July 8, the Government commandeers the vessel for the stated period of a week, returning the vessel to
A in New York on July 15. A's duty to have the vessel ready by July 10 is discharged.
Whether A is then under a duty to allow the loading after July 15 and to make the
voyage to Liverpool, depends on the extent of the burden that this will throw upon him
in view of his other contracts and other circumstances.
Id., Illustrations 3, 4.
71. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs § 463 (1932).
72. The Restatement provides:
Where impossibility of performing part of the performance promised by a party to a
bargain is of such character that if it related to the entire performance it would prevent
the imposition of a duty or would discharge a duty that had arisen, and the remainder
of the performance is not made materially more difficult or disadvantageous than it
would have been if there had been no impossibility, the existence of duty is affected
only as to that part; and if performance of the whole contract is possible with only an
unsubstantial variation, the promisor is under a duty to render performance with that
variation.
Id. The comments explain:
a. The rule stated in the Section deals only with the effect of impossibility of part
of the performance due from a promisor upon the promisor's own duty; and this duty
is qualified by the rule stated in § 460 (2) to the effect that the party whose performance is not impossible must be ready and willing to perform in full the agreed exchange
in order to be entitled to the partial performance. If the contract is divisible the agreed
exchange may be only a portion of the total performance promised. The effect on the
duty of a return promisor is stated in § 274. As in the case of temporary impossibility,
whether a return promisor is discharged depends on whether he will suffer essential
harm if the contract continues in force.
b. Unlike temporary impossibility, impossibility of performing part of a promise
rarely discharges a promisor beyond the extent of the impossibility. It will seldom
throw a greater burden on him to perform part of what he has promised than to perform
the whole of it; and if the equivalent of the part that is impossible to perform can be
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trated by the use of an example. Assume that A, a contractor, has
contracted to build a school. Subsequent to the making of the contract a hurricane strikes the region leaving the area flooded. Until
the waters recede, it is impossible for A to perform and the duty to
perform is suspended. When the waters do recede, 3 months later,
A finds that the price of materials has increased substantially and
seeks to be discharged from the contract. It would seem that under
§ 462 he should be discharged because he has shown that the burden
of performance is substantially greater as a result of the temporary
impossibility.
Rearranging the facts slightly, a case of partial impossibility can
be constructed. Assume that the flooding only affected that portion
of the construction site that was to be the school parking lot. The
parking lot cannot be constructed because of the condition of the
land after the flood waters have receded. Unless A can show that
performance of the remainder of the contract has been rendered
materially more burdensome because of the inability to construct
the parking lot, he will have to build the school.
Consequently, it seems that gaining a total discharge of the obligation to perform is more likely in the case of temporary impossibility than in a partial impossibility situation. Comment b to § 463
supports this conclusion. It states that
Unlike temporary impossibility, impossibility of performing
part of a promise rarely discharges a promisor beyond the extent of impossibility. It will seldom throw a greater burden on
him to perform part of what he has promised than to perform
the whole of it;3
Section 462, on the other hand, makes no such assumption. So long
as the temporary impossibility is
of such a character that is permanent it would discharge a
promisor's entire contractual duty, [it] has that operation if
rendering performance after the impossibility ceases would
impose a burden on the promisor substantially greater than
performed with only an unsubstantial variation of the contract, the promisor must
perform with that variation. The promisor's partial impossibility, however, may justify
the return promisor in refusing to perform, and such refusal may, in turn, justify a
refusal to perform the possible part of the partially impossible promise.
Id., comments a & b.
73. Id., comment b.

1975

Commercial Impracticability

would have been imposed upon him had there been no impossibility . . ..
Partial impossibility, however, does not preclude a total discharge
of the obligation. The case of Edward Maurer Co. v. Tubeless Tire
Co.," though decided prior to the development of the Restatement
is a good example of this. There the plaintiff had agreed to sell and
defendant had agreed to purchase certain tonnages of rubber to be
delivered in monthly installments from May to December of 1918.
The agreement was expressed in two written contracts. Both contracts contained force majeure clauses that excused nonperformance occasioned by government regulation. Both parties were aware
of the fact that rubber importation was likely to be regulated.
Shortly after the contracts were signed (May, 1918), the government
did issue regulations concerning the distribution of rubber. Rubber
already in the United States or on the high seas bound for the
United States was "free" rubber and could be disposed of in any
fashion. All other rubber was regulated rubber and could be sold
only to those users who had a permit. Rubber was allocated on the
basis of prior use, and since defendant's plant was experimental and
had been in operation for a very short time it qualified for only 180
pounds of rubber per month. Because of these regulations no deliveries were made in June, July or August. In September, however,
plaintiff tendered delivery of a quantity equal to one monthly installment under the contract, and defendant refused to accept delivery."6 After the war and after the regulations had been lifted plaintiff
again tendered delivery, and defendant again rejected. Plaintiff was
forced to sell the rubber at less than the contract price because the
market price had fallen considerably. Plaintiff sued defendant for
the difference between the contract price and the sale price.
Plaintiff argued that the wartime regulations had merely suspended the obligation to perform. The trial court decided, however,
that the obligation had been discharged. The court held that in the
absence of express agreement where performance is rendered impossible as a result of governmental act or regulation passed subsequent
to the making of the contract, the parties are discharged." The trial
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. § 462.
272 F. 990 (N.D. Ohio 1921), aff'd, 285 F. 713 (6th Cir. 1922).
Plaintiff was able to make this rubber available because he obtained "free" rubber.
The court expressed its reasoning as follows:
The applicable law seems to be well settled. If performance is made impossible by a
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court also found that it had been the parties' intention that in the
event of government regulation obligations would be discharged, not
just suspended.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed," agreeing that the parties had intended that the obligations be discharged, not merely suspended.
More important for purposes of the discussion, the circuit court also
analyzed the problem of the September delivery, an issue which the
trial court had not addressed. The court determined that defendant
did not have to accept any haphazard deliveries of "free" rubber
because the government regulations discharged defendant's
obligation to purchase.79
While the court's analysis is not as explicit as it could be, the
decision does indicate that the court found that the defendant was
not obligated to accept the September shipment because his performance had become materially more burdensome (in the sense
that the plaintiff's performance was of no value to defendant) because of the earlier partial impossibility of performance.
Thus, when analyzing an "impossibility" or "impracticability"
situation, one must always bear in mind that having first established "impracticability" one must proceed to establish the duration of the "impracticability" and the impact it has on the promisor's performance in both the long and the short run.80
IV.

SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS

The threshold problem for any promisor attempting to avoid persubsequent valid act of law or governmental authority, both parties are discharged. If
a contract is made subject in its entirety to a condition, and that condition happens,
the rule is that both parties are discharged, and not that performance is suspended
until the condition is overcome.
272 F. at 993.
78. 285 F. 713 (6th Cir. 1922).
79. If it were conceded that this was free rubber, either in the United States or en
route to the United States, when the contracts were made, and that defendant then
had the right to purchase and use it in its factories, nevertheless, long before delivery
of this shipment was tendered, the government had refused to permit the plaintiff to
import and sell to the defendant any rubber on either or both of these contracts in
excess of 180 pounds per month. In our opinion that was the virtual end of these
contracts, and the defendant could not be expected, nor would it have been possible
for it, without the raw material, to keep its factory open and in operation, so as to be
in position to accept delivery of whatever free rubber that might occasionally be obtained by plaintiff long after the parties knew that the contracts could not be performed within the intent and purpose of the contracting parties.
Id. at 717.
80. For other cases applying the Restatement type of analysis see Kunglig Jarnvagsstyr-
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formance under § 2-615 will be to establish that the promisor has
not assumed the risk of the supervening event claimed to have rendered performance impracticable. The relevant language of the
Code is "Except so far as seller may have assumed a greater
obligation . ... Official Comment 8 to § 2-615 indicates that
"s

assumption of risk is to be found in the circumstances surrounding
the contract, trade usage, etc., as well as the express terms of the
agreement. Even this directive leaves room for a court to hold that
all risks have been assumed by the promisor if it construes his
promise to be absolute. The doctrine of absolute promise has had a
long history, and still obtained in a number of jurisdictions prior to
the adoption of the Code. As indicated earlier, there is some suggestion in cases applying § 2-615 that, although the doctrine of absolute
promise may not have been incorporated into the Code, the burden
of establishing non-assumption of risk will continue to be a difficult
one.
The promisor who survives the rigors of the assumed risk test
must still establish that performance has become impracticable. It
appears clear from pre-Code case law, the language of the Code, the
intent of the drafters, and the cases under the Code, that the "impracticability" test is similar to Williston's "vitally different" test.
The Code omitted use of the term "impossibility" because it was
generally agreed by the drafters that in some situations nonperformance should be excused even though it had not become scientifically
impossible. The cases applying § 2-615 indicate, however, that
"impracticability" is a test met only in extreme circumstances.
Thus the defense will continue to be a difficult one under the Code.
It is noteworthy that promisors who have characterized the interfering, supervening event as one disrupting a contemplated source
of supply have generally had more success in having their nonperformance excused than have promisors whose performance has simply been rendered more expensive by the event. The lesson seems
to be that promisors seeking to be excused from unexpectedly burdensome performance should isolate as narrowly and specifically as
elsen v. National City Bank, 20 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1927); Dant & Russell v. Grays Harbor
Exportation Co., 26 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd, 106 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1939); Autry v.
Republic Prod., 30 Cal. 2d 144, 180 P.2d 888 (1947); Monite Waterproof Glue Co. v. SawyerCleator Lumber Co., 234 Minn. 89, 48 N.W.2d 333 (1951); Village of Minneota v. Fairbanks,
Morse & Co., 226 Minn. 1, 31 N.W.2d 920 (1948).
81. UNIFORM COMMRCIL CODE § 2-615.
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possible the factors that have rendered performance more burdensome.
If impracticability has been demonstrated, attention must be directed, especially in situations involving long term contracts, to the
effect of the supervening events. Care must be taken to distinguish
temporary from partial impossibility. Performance is temporarily
impossible when performance is impossible during the term of the
agreement but becomes possible after the term has expired. Performance is partially impossible when part, but not all, of the performance is rendered impossible during the term of the agreement.
Temporary impossibility generally excuses that part of the performance rendered impracticable but does not excuse that performance
which remains practicable. In the partial impossibility situation,
the only way to avoid performance entirely is to convince the court
that the remaining performance has. become materially more burdensome as a result of the supervening partial impossibility.
Edward Maurersuggests that the promisor will be excused if he can
demonstrate that, in light of his capital expenditures for the project
as a whole and his intention to spread costs over the entire project,
partial performance has become materially more burdensome, that
to require the promisor to perform would be to require him to allocate the same costs over a much smaller project than was originally
conceived.
Finally, all parties should consider the suggestion made in
Comment 6 to § 2-615. A realignment of prices in line with present
commercial reality might be in everyone's better interest than an
"excuse" or "no excuse" decision.82
82.

A final note. For an excellent overview of the general problems discussed above see
ch. 11 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974). The Tentative Draft
consolidates the Restatement's treatment of impossibility problems. The Tentative Draft
abandons "impossibility" in favor of "impracticability" to emphasize the drafters' agreement
with the UCC approach. The Tentative Draft approves and enlarges upon the UCC approach
to impracticability problems which is not surprising since the UCC codified many of the
suggestions made by the Restatement of Contracts. It remains to be seen just how much
impact the Code and the Tentative Draft will have on the general judicial attitude of hostility
toward the "impracticability" defense. The current economic dislocation should provide
sufficient opportunity to test the willingness of the judiciary to liberalize its approach.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,

